1
Mark A. Graber

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY GOES TO MARKET

The state of constitutional theory is usually assessed from the perspective of a particular
constitutional theory. The conclusion typically is that constitutional theorists should be paying
more attention to what the author is doing and less attention to matters the author has either
abandoned or ignored. Scholars who study constitutionalism outside of the courts complain that
constitutional theorists spend too much time telling Supreme Court justices how to do their job
and too little time critiquing the constitutional performance of other political actors.1 Devotees
of law and economics insist that constitutional theory would be improved by more and better use
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of rational choice.2
This essay assesses the state of constitutional theory from the perspective of higher
education and academic freedom. Constitutional theory in the contemporary United States is
largely yoked to the fate of the academy. Studies on the nature and improvement of political
orders are produced and disseminated largely in universities, colleges and university presses.
When these institutions are flourishing, constitutional theory is likely to be flourishing.
Constitutional theory is healthy, no matter what the particular scholarly fashions at any time,
when academic environments are created and maintained in which constitutional theory is a
valued enterprise and constitutional theorists are free to explore those aspects of that enterprise
thought worthwhile. Themes and ideas compete for intellectual attention based on how
attractive they appear to numerous persons who think contemplating questions of political design
an important endeavor. Until the human intellect is perfected, misjudgments, mistaken priorities
and bias will occur even in ideal speech situations. Nevertheless, when constitutional theory is
valued and free, the products of such contemplating are likely to be as good in that time and
place as is humanely possible.
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Most commentary on academic freedom focuses on the concern that constitutional theory
and related inquiries are not free, rather than on the concern that constitutional theory and related
inquiries are not valued. Proponents of academic freedom are ever alert to combat pressures that
may dissuade scholars in all disciplines from relying on those methods or reaching those
conclusions they think best. These threats to the academic and constitutional enterprise,
however, are often rooted in strong commitments to the value of academic and constitutional
discourse. The greater threat to higher education and constitutional theory during the twentiethfirst century is a decline in these commitments. Academic values associated with truth seeking
are increasingly being subordinated to external norms associated with the university=s quest for
more funding. As higher education goes to market, the result is likely to be less constitutional
theory and less interesting constitutional theory.

A. Censorship, Academic Freedom, and Constitutional Theory

The traditional threat to higher education and constitutional theory is pressure for
conformity. Lines of inquiry that seem intellectually attractive are abandoned or not adequately
pursued because persons who control academic life do not tolerate serious challenges to reigning
political or scholarly orthodoxies. Constitutional and other thinkers during the 1950s too closely
identified with communism or socialism risked losing their positions.3 Many conservatives
complain that the academy is presently biased against constitutional thinkers who defend free
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markets and Atraditional@ values.4 Particular reviewers, departments, and disciplines are not
open to any scholarship that does not rely on statistics, makes too much use of formal theory, or
concludes that big business supported Hitler.5 Constitutional theory shaped by these and related
pressures devolves into an exercise in discovering additional proofs for what is already known
and providing additional reasons for what is already believed.
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Pressures for conformity are difficult to evaluate in political or university settings when
they are plausibly linked to substantive commitments underlying the policy or the academy. Just
as atheists are justly denied admission to seminaries and the German constitution bans parties
committed to undermining certain democratic norms, so arguably might a communist who
rejects academic freedom be denied teaching positions.6 Universities are committed to norms of
civility and quality. Professors should fail a paper that does no more than rant, even if such
speech is protected by the First Amendment. Proponents of discrimination against homosexuals
are not entitled to representation on faculties simply because many persons hold such beliefs, if
no respectable justification exists for such policies.7
These examples illustrate how the difference between censorship and upholding
legitimate academic standards often depends on contestable notions of constitutionalism and
academic freedom. When constitutional theorists compete for scarce publication spaces and
faculty positions, some standard must be used for distinguishing better scholarship from worse.
Senior academics who cannot agree on the best constitutional theories are likely to dispute what
works in constitutional theory are sufficiently scholarly to merit publication or inclusion on a
syllabus. The gatekeepers for constitutional theory will not only often be misguided, they will
sometimes be insincere. Nevertheless, if hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue, one
important limit on traditional threats to constitutional theory and academic freedom is that
exclusion must be justified in terms of values internal to constitutionalism and higher education.
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One must make plausible claims that an argument is incompetent or subversive before denying
the author an academic position or audience.

B. Money, Academic Integrity and Constitutional Theory

Contemporary threats to constitutional theory are increasing associated with external
challenges to the value of the academic enterprise, rather than disputes over the implementation
of academic values. The traditional virtues of teaching and research are being discarded or
demphasized as the university turns to the marketplace for more money. The concern for
financing, standing alone, is not new. Economic realities have always required some
compromises with academic norms. Witness the role of big time athletics, whose role seems
limited to fundraising, publicity, and embarrassing the faculty. What has changed is the intensity
of financial concerns and the increased prominence of market considerations in academic
decision-making. Some reasons are external to the university. At a time when the normal costs
of academic life are increasing, local legislatures are reducing university budgets and federal
largess has been cut.8 Other reasons are internal. Partly as a consequence of the need for new
sources of revenue, university administration is increasingly being turned over to persons whose
values are shaped by the marketplace rather than by any intellectual commitments. The New
York Times reports that university presidents are now expected to be Asmooth fundraisers,@ not
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Money becomes the measure of all things academic as the university goes to market.
Administrators justify greater funding for higher education by emphasizing how research
improves material standards of living. In the words of one academic bureaucrat, universities
advance Aeconomic development by developing knowledge-linked activities that enhance
technological commercialization, support organizational and community change, and enhance
the competencies of workers and professionals.@10 Research is oriented toward obtaining private
sector funding. Dollars replace citation counts as the objective measure of scholarly
productivity. The quality of ideas often seems moot. Some universities encourage faculty to
sign and honor agreements not to publish adverse findings when doing so facilitates obtaining a
large grant. Undergraduate education is a credentialing service aimed at increasing student
income upon graduation. Students are consumers who are to be satisfied rather than citizens
who are to be educated.
Exaggerating the influence of money is easily done in a polemic. Many areas of
university life, most notably junior hires and promotion, remain largely untouched by the
entrepreneurial imperative. Well funded law schools (and elite private universities) are less
affected by market concerns than public undergraduate and PhD granting programs.
Nevertheless, market norms have become far more prominent when academic decisions are
made. Administrators spend more time determining whether Pepsi or Coke shall have exclusive
marketing rights on campus. Less energy is spent defending the public value of universities,
university research and university education. These trends are not limited to the academy. At a
time when the Supreme Court majority is increasingly equating commercial speech and public
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discourse,11 we should not be surprised that universities are equating consumers and citizens, and
that higher education is regarded as just another business or interest group.
C. Constitutional Theory in the New University

Constitutional theorists have particular reasons for concern about the market-driven
university. Markets are likely to be bad for constitutional theorists, bad for the production of
constitutional theory and bad for the dissemination of constitutional theory. The increased sense
that money is the measure of all things academic is likely to further foster a sense that money is
the measure of all things political, indeed of all things. Notions that the good life may not be a
life devoted to money making or that the good polity may have goals other than immediate
wealth maximization are likely to seem absurd in the present university climate. To the extent
constitutional theorists enthusiastically participate in the quest for funding, citizens, legislators
and students are likely to perceive with some reason that the primary purpose of constitutional
theory is to provide resources for constitutional theorists.
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A market driven university is bad for constitutional theorists, who are unlikely as a group
to win the enormous grants cherished by the contemporary academy. Constitutional research is
largely a solitary enterprise. What is needed is time to read, reflect, and discuss. Few
constitutional theorists need teams of research assistants and even fewer need equipment more
complicated that a computer that can handle basic word processing. Creative constitutional
theorists will think of ways to expand budgets, but their efforts will easily be dwarfed by other
scholars whose research really does require substantial funding. Unable to compete
entrepreneurally, constitutional theorists will be poorly placed to obtain new positions or even
maintain existing lines. Recent developments in public law may be a harbinger of a more
general future. At a time when a renaissance is taking place in constitutional theory among
political scientists,12 positions are being taken away. Publications in the leading scholarly
journals and university presses have not inspired university administrators to retail existing slots
for scholars who do not get research grants. As the supply of constitutional theorists diminishes,
so will constitutional theory.
A market driven academy produces bad constitutional theory. Grant funding is
problematic even in the hard sciences. Corporations fund only research likely to improve their
market share. Problems associated with bias are greater in constitutional theory. Most outside
groups who fund constitutional theory projects or constitutional theorists are primarily
interesting in generating justifications for their preferred policies. New ideas flourish in this
environment only when powerful groups outside the academy have interested reasons for
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promoting those ideas. The libertarian turn in constitutional scholarship, for example, is partly a
consequence of the increased resources available to libertarian constitutionalists. Funding on the
left promises similar untoward consequences. When constitutional theorists must obtain outside
support, constitutional theory is likely to become more reliable across the board. Theorists on
both the left and right will devote energy to finding new reasons for supporting existing clusters
of political positions, rather than offering truly new ways of conceptualizing the constitutional
universe.
Grant funding skews constitutional theory in unfortunate ways even when not explicitly
concerned with politically correct conclusions. Constitutional theorists may be tempted to
employ politically correct quantitative methods when exploring political regimes in order to
obtain prestigious grants from the National Science Foundation. A good case can be made that
the increased sovereignty of rational choice and statistical research in political science has far
more to do with the availability of funding than the comparative merits of behavioral and
humanistic research. Intellectual entrepreneurs tend to practice celebrity constitutional theory,
which specializes on making hard questions appear easy. Uncomplicated positions are more
attractive to funding organizations and a news media that can be worked to generate more funds.
A constitutional thinker who appears regularly on Nightline makes a better impression on state
legislators and potential donors than one whose picture appears only on the cover of university
press books. Academics concerned with publicity are best off advancing ideas that can be
effectively summarized in a seven-second sound bite. Such claims as Aaffirmative action is
simple racism@ or Aonly disguised racists oppose affirmative action,@ if promoted effectively,
may reap substantial material rewards. Whether such claims promote intelligent public debate is
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of secondary concern to academic entrepreneurs.
The market driven university slackens demand for courses on constitutional theory and
related subjects. Entrepreneurial universities are comfortable performing the educational
functions once performed by high schools, providing future workers with the minimal skills
necessary for most desirable jobs. The most attractive courses in this learning environment are
teach such matters as accounting, which seem directly relevant to work after graduation.
Courses on constitutionalism survive because undergraduate consumers mistakenly believe
classes in constitutional law to be good preparation for law school. Constitutionalism outside of
the courts, unless tweaked to suit the interest of would-be lobbyists, does not thrive in the market
driven university.
Market driven constitutional theory further diminishes constitutional education by
removing credentialed constitutional theorists from the classroom. Universities driven by
financial concerns place even less emphasis on teaching undergraduates than universities driven
by research concerns. The traditional problem associated with the prominent researcher who
cannot teach is exacerbated when universities routinely encourage faculty to buy out their course
obligations. Indifference to undergraduates evolves from a slight handicap to a qualification for
obtaining academic positions. As research faculty turn away from undergraduate teaching,
courses on constitutionalism are taught in increasingly larger classes, and by adjuncts or
graduate students. At best, such classes offer watered down versions of the best constitutional
thinking. At worst, they serve as a credentialing service for law schools.
Matters are likely to get worse. Budget conscious state legislators and academic
administrators will soon realize that if graduate students and adjuncts are expected to teach the
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constitutional law sequence with some frequency, no good reason exists for ever having the
sequence taught by a senior professor. This insight promises to yield policies that further reduce
the gap between secondary and post-secondary education. The university of the future may have
a teaching faculty with salaries, educational attainments, and course loads similar to that of the
teaching faculty in public high schools. Only the few constitutional theorists can obtain research
grants will enjoy substantial salaries and the time to do serious constitutional research. They, of
course, will not teach undergraduates.

D. Whither the University

Constitutional theorists during the eighteenth century celebrated the separation of powers
as a practice necessary to maintain republican government. Power united, they believed, would
be power abused. AThe concentrat(ion)@ of Aall the powers of government . . . in the same
hands,@ James Madison and Thomas Jefferson agreed, Ais precisely the definition of despotic
government.@13 Contemporary political thinkers insist this insight be applied to power outside
of government as well as power within government. Robert Dahl and Michael Walzer champion
Acumulative inequalities@14 and Aspheres of justice@15 as means for preventing any resource
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from enabling possessors to control all dimensions of human life. Republican government, they
recognize, functions best when no person, no institution and no one good dominates. Academic
freedom and integrity are aspects of this republican commitment to social pluralism. The
optimistic justification of the separation between the academy and the market is that persons
trained in constitutional theory will make better judgments than business entrepreneurs on
questions of constitutional scholarship. The pessimistic justification is that persons trained in
constitutional theory will at least make different judgments than business entrepreneurs.
Resisting the market will be difficult. Peaceful changes in constitutional systems must
typically be approved by politicians who gained their positions successfully playing by existing
rules.16 The steps necessary to maintain and restore traditional academic values will similarly
have to be initiated by the intellectual and administrative entrepreneurs who are prospering in the
market university. Their practices will more likely increase celebrity constitutional theory,
reduce undergraduate exposure to constitutional analysis outside of constitutional law, and
sharply limit any thinking about political regimes that seriously attempts social criticism.
Academics did not distinguish themselves resisting McCarthy. The question remains whether
we will do better resisting Mammon.
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